The scenes of a gaping hole in a new 737 MAX-9 returning to land at Portland’s airport suggest the terror inside the aircraft when the door plug explosively left the Alaska Airlines aircraft and rapidly depressurized the cabin.
It is the latest incident suggesting trouble at one of America’s top manufacturers. There are two issues at play here; responsibility for safety and inspections, and the use of subcontractors for manufacturing. More on that in a bit.
Incident to drive change?
Strategically, this case is being handled differently than earlier incidents involving Boeing’s safety practices- and this may be the case that brings change.
Let’s start with Boeing on this specific incident. When the 737 MAX-8 first crashed in Indonesia a little more than five years ago, Boeing pushed to keep the aircraft in the air. After a second crash in Ethiopia the jetliner was grounded worldwide. This time, with the Alaska MAX-9, Boeing’s actions were the opposite. The company immediately agreed with the grounding of 171 aircraft and promised full cooperation with the investigation.
Then, in a remarkably candid and emotional all-hands meeting, Boeing CEO David Calhoun took responsibility for an apparent manufacturing defect, which allowed the door plug to blow off the aircraft. He promised an internal investigation into safety protocols, telling his employees that, “every detail” matters.
Boeing’s regulator, the Federal Aviation Administration, has already announced its own investigation. The FAA will conduct an audit of Boeing’s practices and data. “We are working to make sure nothing like this happens again,” FAA Administrator Mike Whitaker said. The new Administrator, who has worked in the airline industry and at the FAA before, went even further, suggesting maybe Boeing has too much authority.
Inspection responsibility
This is the first issue I mentioned- safety and inspection responsibility. Twenty years ago, as Boeing was facing even keener competition from Europe’s Airbus, the US company asked to change the responsibility for inspections and certifications of aircraft. Boeing wanted more of that responsibility to move faster in its competition with Airbus. Congress approved the significant change, known as the Organization Delegation Authority. ODA allows a manufacturer to take over some of the duties that would normally be conducted by FAA staff.
(Credit: CNBC)
ODA was a big issue in the certification of the 737 MAX. The FAA took responsibility for areas it felt were important. But ODA status gave Boeing control for many milestones including a new software aimed to prevent stalling of the new 737. That system led to the two MAX-8 crashes.
“This delegation of authority, we want to commission a review of that and see if that is a risk in the system as well,” the FAA Administrator told CNBC.
Members of Congress, including some who voted for ODA in the 2003 FAA reauthorization bill, want answers too. One of them is Senator Maria Cantwell. The democrat represents Washington State where the MAX-9 is assembled. Cantwell wants to know, “whether manufacturers and FAA oversight failed to meet safety regulations.” Those are regulations Cantwell and Congress approved two decades ago.
The FAA Administrator wonders if there is a third way. Should there be a third party that takes more responsibility in Boeing factories? “Could we get a technical, non-profit organization that provides that approval or oversight, and then we oversee that organization?,” Whitaker told CNBC.
Subcontracting
Next issue. While Boeing is responsible for everything in every aircraft it delivers, it does rely heavily on subcontractors. In this case, the 737 fuselages are built in Kansas by Spirit AeroSystems. Spirit’s Wichita plants were part of Boeing from 1939 until 2005. Since the sale, Spirit has put the best-selling fuselages on rail cars and shipped them to Renton, Washington for final assembly. Spirit installed the plug door on the Alaska MAX-9 at the center of this story. As Boeing has increased sales, there have been increasing pressures on Spirit to produce and questions about quality.
Boeing has a self-admitted spotty record with subcontractors. In the late 90s the company was looking to sell jetliners to multiple countries and came up with a plan. Boeing would partner with manufacturers in those countries to build a part of the new 787, with the hope those countries would then buy the 787.
The Dreamliner was Boeing’s first carbon fiber aircraft. The idea was all those international manufacturers would deliver their part of the jet and Boeing would put it together like Legos. It didn’t work, at all. The CEO at the time finally admitted the subcontracting plan was not executed successfully. “Could we have done it smarter? Yes,” Jim McNerney told the New York Times in 2009.
These two issues- responsibility and subcontracting- will drive the debate about the company established more than a century ago by building biplanes to deliver the mail. Boeing says it is committed to fixing the problems. They have said that before. This time the government may help by adjusting oversight of the jet maker and its major contractors.
As usual, wonderfully informative about a subject that lives in my head every time I climb aboard an airplane. I don't like to fly in the first place. Now you've scared the pants off me! Good piece.